Ritualizing Li: Implications for Studying Power and Gender

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In 1878, as part of his series on Universal Religion, American scholar Samuel Johnson differentiated the Chinese mind from the Hindu: Hindus were “cerebral,” while Chinese were “muscular” (Johnson 1878, 5; his italics).

To do, not to think about doing; to fashion the stuff of life, not to contemplate it. . . . The Chinese creative faculty remains within the plane of certain organic habits, failing to rise from the formalism of rules to the freedom of the idea. (p. 6)

The “formal rules” that “immobilized” the Chinese in petty detail, preventing them from getting any transcendent distance from life, were *li*.

As a branch of ceremonialism which makes so important a part of Chinese life, these fine-spun courtesies serve to mark what grotesque transformations may befall the higher elements of character when absorbed by an intense interest in concrete details. (p. 13)
The "grotesque transformation" that Johnson most decries is the replacement of "progress" as a social goal by "propriety," "descriptive of the mutual obeisance to which the life of all human aspiration is reduced" (p. 17). Johnson uses a number of terms to characterize Chinese li: formal rules, ceremonialism, courtesy, propriety. He emphasizes the concreteness of their detail and, by way of criticism, their mutual and hierarchical nature. But by framing his descriptions within unself-consciously self-serving judgments about national character, Johnson seems to signal his distance from us.

We modern scholars of the Chinese past may imagine ourselves today as sophisticated adepts in the historically dense sedimentation of conventions for studying others. We are aghast and amused at the silliness of Victorian accounts of Chinese life such as Johnson's. We have read our bloody colonial histories with discomfort; we have understood the equally, though differently, pernicious pitfalls of modernization theories that transformed a zeal for souls into a zeal for progress. Yet the dualism that most profoundly underlies and organizes Johnson's discussion of Chinese social life, that of the cerebral and the muscular, the mind and the body, remains central to present analysis of li as ritual. We seem unwittingly to share many nineteenth-century presuppositions about human nature.

Two or three generations of cultural anthropologists have attempted to reject models for understanding human life based upon such universal concepts of human nature, but this particular bifurcation seems to be especially difficult to theorize into abandonment. Even as anthropologists set off in search of "native categories" instead of "universal nature," they seemed unaware that their newfound sensitivity to local mores might still be underwritten by old presuppositions.

In this essay, I will reflect ironically upon my "discovery" a decade ago of traces in eighteenth-century Chinese texts and artifacts of the operation of such a native category, "li." Li summarized a way of being human necessary to the cosmos: the principles and practices by which the interpenetration of the cosmic and human worlds was maintained by human intervention. The eighteenth-century Encyclopedia of the Five Li (Wuli tongkao) lists the Auspicious for ancestral veneration; the Felicitous for marriage, and so on; the Military; the Guest; and the Funerary. Correct encoding, propagation,
and performance of *li* were mostly monopolized by literati men and considered the purview of those who ruled.\(^1\) *Li* were textually transmitted from ancient times. For modern scholars, this state of affairs is coded as Confucian (for philosophers), imperial or official (for anthropologists), and scholar-gentry (for historians). Thus our own disciplinary boundaries are in some part legitimated by various interpretations of *li* and its ownership.

I will reflect ironically because, although “ritual” remains the term of choice in English to translate the Chinese word *li*, “ritual” also names a social scientific discourse for organizing and understanding comparatively a panoply of practices from funerary ceremony to answering the door. I still recall my naive delight at having my work so obviously presented to me: I would merely turn to anthropology to learn how to study “ritual” and I would know how to analyze *li*.

This essay describes my fall from such methodological innocence. “Ritual,” I came to understand, obscured as much as it illuminated, creating artificial boundaries and false unities, releasing red herrings all over the Chinese cultural landscape. Here I will first discuss how social science approaches in some anthropology of China have followed the major post-Cartesian fault line of mind versus body in bifurcating ritual into either meaning or performance (alas, Mr. Johnson carried on his suspicious project within a since well-worn groove). Then I will propose that we think of *li* as a discourse that, rather than *being* ritual, in fact contained “ritualization” as one of its parts.\(^2\) Finally, I will outline what an alternative cultural historical approach that grounds itself in the local specificities of *li* implies for the problems of bodies and genders. Such an approach, with its emphasis upon the production of situated subjectivities and their circulating meanings in situations of domination or resistance, offers new insights.

The difficulty lies in traversing the boundaries between the Chinese native categories and our own. It is not merely a matter of understanding our own presuppositions so that they can be transcended, but rather of appreciating the possibility that these boundaries themselves, the conceptual differences that seem to stand in the way of the transparent translation between worlds, may serve other agendas. Our “misunderstandings” may, in fact, help produce our scholarly practice itself.
Opposing Reifications in Ritual Studies

Ritual studies stresses the idea of a fieldstudy . . . because ritual is the hardest phenomenon to capture in texts or comprehend by thinking.—Ronald Grimes

In a recent volume entitled *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* (1988), coeditor and anthropologist James L. Watson argues for primacy of performance over belief, while coeditor and historian Evelyn Rawski disagrees, seeing belief and performance as both necessary to ritual life and necessary for its control by the state.

Watson insists on the prevalence of “orthopraxy” in Chinese ritual life, maintaining that the state did not concern itself with belief, only with correct performance. He says “the internal state of the participants, their personal beliefs and predispositions, are largely irrelevant” (p. 6). (Of course, his point here is “irrelevant” to the Chinese state, not to his own understanding.) He outlines a performance sequence for funerary rites common by the Ming dynasty (1365–1644), consisting of the public notification of death, the putting on of mourning dress, the bathing of the corpse, the transfer of goods from the living to the dead, the preparation and installation of the spirit tablet, the use of paid professionals and music, the encoffining of the corpse, and finally the expulsion of the coffin. According to Watson, having abandoned control of the “ideological” as too complex, the state sought to prescribe and intervene in the performative domain. The elite espoused, exemplified, and encouraged this orthopraxy.

Here I take up Watson’s invitation in his essay, which he described as “polemical,” to explore this question. Watson’s split between belief and performance seems to me to restate the long-standing division in positivist social science of thought and action, theory and practice. What would happen if we were to read these as binaries that present false choices?—or, rather, that present ideologically motivated choices that contribute to the production of a particular form of domination?

Sherry Ortner’s discussion in “Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties” (1984) shows that the tendencies to divorce meaning from performance, minds from bodies, have run deep in anthropology. Ortner charts the move from symbolic and structural models of social life to practice-oriented ones—in other words, from models that located meaning at a level other
than experience to models that included the actor. In studying ritual, anthropologists turned from the cognitive, symbolic aspects of a ceremony to emphasize its active performance, not merely its display of symbols for analysis analogous to a text.4

The most sophisticated of performance-oriented practice theory, for instance Pierre Bourdieu's (1977), has promised a transcendence and reincorporation of meaningful structure into action, of belief with performance. Yet when we see performance theories in context and in conjunction with the symbolic and structural models of social and ritual life that they mean to replace, we notice their own partiality. Performance theories merely counterpose the willing body to the curious, anxious mind. Instead of rituals that solve cognitive or emotional angst by providing meaning, we have rituals that solve social conflicts by organizing docile bodies in performance. In studies of Chinese li, the rough equivalent of the meaning/performance and mind/body split in anthropology is the split between philosophers and institutional historians.

The earliest work on li was done in philosophy. Concentrating upon texts, writers were interested in what li meant for writers. Many modern philosophers have interpreted li in the context of something they call “Confucian humanism.” They see Confucius' writings as marking a turn from the supernatural toward the ethical. This classificatory move rests upon an analogy made between Confucianism's immanentist anthropocentrism and European Renaissance humanism. Furthermore, these philosophers have often translated li as propriety, emphasizing its abstract quality as a rational standard of value for individuals.5 In doing so they have opposed Confucianism to Daoism as the cultural and ethically obsessed opposes the natural. Here philosophers base their thinking upon yet another analogy with European experience, a Cartesian framework that posits an internally consistent, psychological subject who exists in tension with external society and then opposes the social order to the natural.

These philosophers share a tendency to neglect or deemphasize the ceremonial practices associated with li in favor of a “meaning-centered” approach reminiscent of symbolic anthropology. In unconscious collusion with the philosophic texts they study, they make the material circum-
stances of the productions of such textuality, along with the performing bodies of ritualists, disappear.

And those interested in performance? In studies of Chinese li, institutional historians have emphasized ceremonial performance with far less attention to meaning. Treating li as a code for conduct, they explain the coherent systems developed by rulers in imperial China to accomplish certain tasks without questioning wider beliefs in practice that provided the “bureaucracy” with the very context of its functioning.6

At this point we might conclude that theories of ritual (or li) that either reify the mind or overemphasize the body are useless by virtue of their incompleteness. The skeptical might even wonder if these opposing reifications of “mental” versus “performance” in fact require one another for their analytic existence at all. Once we connect them in this fashion, it becomes easier to understand them as mutually necessary moments in a discourse that, like all discourses, creates the very objects it then purports to analyze. Following Bourdieu (1977, 1–30), I would call this discourse “objectivist.”

By “objectivist” I mean the powerful Cartesian vision of a world objectified as meaning, available for representation by all knowing minds, whatever their color, gender, or class (Bordo 1988). In the objectivist universe, symbolism is possible because mind and its meanings are forever separate from the world and its facts (thus, we have invented the sign and its referent).7 The Cartesian division between mind-reduced-to-knower facing a world-objectified-as-knowledge separates, first, body from mind and, second, the actor from the world.8 The performative critique at least seeks to restore the body to the mindful person. But performance approaches fundamentally do nothing for the actor divided from the world’s wider context because of the lurking theatrical metaphor. The actor is stranded upon a stage (all puns intended). Furthermore, imagining ritual as performance “naturalizes” the position of the analytic observer into that of a member of the audience, confounding an act of interpretation with an act of participation while still confining native ritualists to the status of actors instead of thinkers (Bell 1992, 39, 42). Can we avoid “ritualizing” li?

Catherine Bell observes that analysts often see ritual as “behavioral” while myth and doctrine are seen as “conceptual.” She points out that this
way of thinking about ritual fits very neatly with the act of the theory-building itself: ritual becomes the behavioral object of our own conceptualizations. The category of ritual, far from existing as a “thing” separate from the analyst’s eye, is to a great extent brought into being as analysts seeking satisfying answers to their questions about phenomena like social integration, conflict resolution, meaning, and culture. These questions are, of course, already based upon points of view, theories, and epistemological necessities. Thus, Bell positions us to understand the process of classification and categorization that is the practice of our own theorizing. If she is right in proposing a homology between ritual as our created object and our theories of it, then she is also right in proposing that we must “grasp differentiation itself as an activity, and to begin to appreciate the activity of theory-making” (1992, 112).

Literate Chinese concerned with *li* were also theory-builders. Thus, historian Evelyn Rawski maintains, contra Watson, that the state did try to link orthopraxy to orthodoxy and that “belief and performance are very hard to separate” (Watson and Rawski 1988, 22). Now we can read Watson’s actually quite important insight that the two were separated in a different light. The question to ask is not whether or not belief and performance were linked but rather how they were linked, in what contexts and to what ends.

In making the counter-case that belief and performance were tightly knit in Chinese ritual, Rawski rightly points out that during their enforcement of standardized ritual performance, officials and local elites explicitly tried to disseminate values and beliefs (pp. 20–36). That is, they linked belief and performance very closely. Clearly, *li* were early connected to ancestor veneration, and thence to a constellation of beliefs and practices tied to family life, group historical continuity, and correct rule. By the eighteenth century, as commentary upon and exegesis of the Classics reached a summarizing apogee, the essence of true government was thought to inhere in the concrete ritual prescriptions of the past. Thus, the study of *li* held a particular fascination for the ruling members of the scholar-gentry (Elman 1984, 116).

In my own work on eighteenth-century imperial *li*, I have noticed that text and performance were distinctively related as moments of process
within a discursive formation of great power. In other words, the nonseparation, the conflation, and the intimate interpenetration of body and mind, meaning and action, were precisely an effect of \( \text{li} \). Any mode of analysis that automatically "ritualizes" \( \text{li} \) by separating these aspects from one another does it great disservice.

**\( \text{Li as Discourse} \)**

Each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices. —Michel Foucault

Fitting \( \text{li} \) into either of the categories of meaning or performance generated by the analytics of ritual studies limits its power. I propose thinking of \( \text{li} \) as a discourse. According to Timothy Reiss (1982, 9), "The term discourse refers to the way in which the material embodying sign processes is organized. Discourse can thus be characterized as the visible and describable praxis of what is called 'thinking.'"

In other words, material and thoughtful life are produced simultaneously: within any social formation, the relationships between words and things, and the practices whereby these conventions are instituted, imply subjectivities who will understand and "find" themselves through these practices. (By subjectivities I mean positions within which identities form that provide grounds for practice, that is, acts in the world [Smith 1988; Henriques et al. 1984].) Discourse is a constitutive practice whose traces we find in its products, one of which is subjectivity itself. Appropriate subjectivities are produced as meaning is created and circulated as part of the materiality of building a world to live in. The equation of these discursive factors differs from place to place and epoch to epoch. I would thus take the investigation of the discursive production of subjectivities to be a key task for cultural historians.

Regarded in this light, \( \text{li} \) as a discourse first posited a whole that preceded and organized its parts historically: call it a cosmology or a discursive ground, it provided the ongoing validation for social dispositions through its text/performances. It also organized protocols for the training of people to retrieve correct \( \text{li} \) from the past and re-present them in the present.
The eighteenth-century textual traces of *li* were of four sorts: sets of ceremonial prescriptions in handbooks; objects of exegesis for scholar-literati; codes of conduct in materials like the Sacred Edict; and reservoirs of appropriate means for discussing political life (Zito 1984). As the sum of the perspectives of its performed texts, *li* provided the articulation that gave them effect.

Second, *li* organized strategies for forming subject positions. Theorization about social life within discourses of *li* constantly emphasized the Five Bonds of ruler/subject, father/son, husband/wife, elder/younger sib; and friend/friend. These subject positions (ruler, subject, father, mother, son, daughter, friend of higher status, friend of lower status, elder, younger) were practically embodied in varieties of ways that produced reciprocal hierarchical relations.

Third, *li* enacted also sought to guarantee that the parts of this whole were hierarchically ordered, shifting and containing one another in different situations. In the seventeenth century, a display of knowledge of *li* through proper ceremony was good, but by the eighteenth century it was not as good as writing books about *li*. Far from being an abstract and transcendent standard of behavior imposed upon all people equally, *li* included finely differentiated practices that created a network of relationships, thus enabling situated subjectivities. Not all of these possible positions were equally important, nor were they equally available to all people, but all were necessary to reproducing Chinese social life.

Fourth, *li* also specified a “perfect person,” an “ideal subject” in all senses of that word: one who not only performed practically and bodily the appropriate ceremonial *li*, but reflected upon that performance in various sorts of permanently expressive media—texts, paintings, music. Such persons produced texts that were performed, and performed texts. They lived transtemporally: through literacy they were able to retrieve a sagely past for enactment in the present, with an eye for hurling their representations into a future when they themselves would be ancestors.

In other words, *li* provides a model for what we might call perfect praxis in the embodied subject positions of ruler/subject and father/son. But we must not mistake these for a general Chinese embodied self—that would be a misrecognition of a body of ideology that sought to generate
desire of imitation for the whole of social life. For the analyst, it is to fall victim to the imperium's own vision of itself. The emperor's power lay in the distance of longing that his imperium could create between this yang body of power and the bodies of everyday life. Because imitation was itself considered a form of profoundly meaningful participation in late imperial life, the imperium sought to provide above all a modeling of modeling.

**Imperial Li as Text/Performance**

The underlying assumption of these rituals is that the gentry should publicly lead the rural members of their lineages and propagate the four rituals. These they should put into practice so as to assist the officials in their reform of local customs.— Huang Zuo (1490–1566)

In eighteenth-century China, both editing and sacrifice shared the goal of manifesting, showing, or making visible that which had been hidden, obscure, or invisible. Grand Sacrifice can be seen as a perfect instance of rule by wen, signs of cosmic order accessible to those who could read and reproduce them. These men were chosen to serve in the imperium through that vast ritualized competition in writing, the examination system.

In constructing and presenting the emperor (and cosmos, filiality, and the emperor's servants, his imperium), Grand Sacrifice began with editing and writing. Text and performance fused to form a set. The distinctions produced first in classification were then materialized on altars in temples. Handbooks and canons preserved ritual in the medium of language, but they did not merely "represent" rituals by providing a guide for future ceremonial performance wherein gestures, objects, and music were reconstructed from written description. In Chinese imperial ritual, the relation between written text and performance through gestural, nonverbal action presents some interesting variations upon the dialectic of script and play.

In ritual texts, the forms of the rites were iconically embodied and prefigured (Zito 1984). Conversely, the performance of the rite included practices of "ordering" and "classification," alternating with an "examination" and "investigation" that resonate with editing method. Words and texts also reappear, recontextualized within ceremonial, themselves objects of
ritual performances. And, of course, calligraphy itself is a microritual of posture and gesture that yields a venerated product.

In its fusion of text/performance, Grand Sacrifice provided the intersection of the discourse upon filiality (xiao) through ancestor veneration with discourses upon history and its retrieval through texts (wen), two potent forms of social power. Thus Grand Sacrifice allowed the throne to display and control contradictions of the reproduction of its own power: should power be inherited by filial sons or by knowledgeable scholars? To restate their problem: who is more important—those who produce wen, “cosmic text-pattern,” available to those who can discern it and make it materialize in building(s), writing, and music, or those who produce xiao, filiality, through bearing and raising sons, and inculcating the bodily performances of rituals? Of course, both the circulation of correct meanings and the production of appropriate persons are equally important to a cultural formation.

I began to see that wen and xiao constituted two inseparable modes within Grand Sacrifice and to refer to it as text/performance. As both Perfect Sage and filial Son of Heaven, the emperor proclaimed his fitness to rule in written edicts and editing projects, while with every performance of Grand Sacrifice, he embodied these written scripts. In the meantime, emulating the throne, the literati elite proved itself fit to rule through ritual study and writing. The material engagement through texts with questions of belief was itself a marker of elite status. Literati seized the possibility of encompassing both text and performance in li, thus constituting themselves as rulers and sons. Literacy in the classics provided a different register within which to perform the filial duties of social and aesthetic reproduction.

To demand or allow that engagement of all Chinese people would have reduced the efficacy of the very mechanism that produced the ever-shifting boundary between ruler and ruled. By the eighteenth century, that boundary was very fluid, constantly reinscribed by shifts in literacy that produced a range of experts between the imperium and the masses (for example, ritual specialists like Taoist and Buddhist priests, geomancers, copiers, and clerks of all sorts) (Naquin 1988; Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski 1985). 

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Thus, Watson notices correctly that the elite tended not to concern themselves with the “meanings” and “beliefs” of their inferiors. We could go further and note a tendency in philosophical texts to repress the practical bodiliness of rituals. In this mutual masking of the whole (the body disappears in one place, meaning is evacuated in another) lies the area of negotiation between rulers and ruled that constituted the hegemony that encompassed them both.

**Implications for Bodies and Genders**

Agonistic logics, logics of ritual and seduction, are stronger than sex.—Jean Baudrillard

As an example of what a cultural historical approach has to offer, we can briefly explore issues of the “ritualization” of body and gender within *li* as subjectivity-productive discourse.

In eighteenth-century China, successful intervention in cosmic process, or correct *li*, depended upon the peculiarly human ability to provide the site for ordered pattern to emerge from chaos. Discourses on painting, medicine, and ritual converged in emphasizing the site of this emergent pattern, which was then accessible as various forms of knowledge, as an ever-shifting boundary or surface. The creation of boundaries that create difference and bring it under control and the display of this power upon surfaces were organized under the term “centering” (Zito, forthcoming).

Within the discourse of *li*, the word *zhong*, “center,” does not mean “inside” (that is *nei*, whose antonym is *wai*, “outside”; *zhong* has no proper opposite term). As a noun it means “middle,” but an empty one, found between the inner and outer, where the upper and lower meet and where there is no movement in the four directions. As a verb, *zhong* means to hit the center. “Centering” thus constantly creates itself through the correct separation of upper and lower, the correct bounding of inner and outer. Conceived of in this manner, it is the mediate third that makes meaningful difference possible. When people “make the triad with Heaven and Earth,” they *zhong*, providing meaningful connection between these two constantly related forces.16
"Centering," or *zhong*, was embodied in the bodies and vessels of imperial ritual. Chinese ritualists imagined both vessels and bodies differently from us. For them, the vessel's nature as a "container" was secondary. It was its unction as boundary between interior and exterior, and it was the vessel as sign-bearing surface, that resonated with the body. I can illustrate this peculiarity of metaphor by exploring how centering was accomplished within built space. Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 89) notes,

It is in the dialectical relationship between the body and a space structured according to the mythico-ritual oppositions that one finds the form par excellence of the structural apprenticeship which leads to the em-bodying of the structures of the world.

Through the practices of everyday life, including inhabiting spaces, people acquire a *habitus*, the "system of lasting transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions" (p. 83). Catherine Bell (1992, 140–142 and passim) calls this "ritualization," synthesizing Bourdieu, Foucault, and anthropologist Jean Comaroff. For Bell,

ritualization produces this ritualized body through the interaction of the body with a structured and structuring environment. . . . Hence, through a series of physical movements ritual practices spatially and temporally construct an environment organized according to schemes of privileged opposition. The construction of this environment and the activities within it simultaneously work to impress these schemes upon the bodies of participants. (p. 98)

The spatial embodying of *Grand Sacrifice* provides us a carefully documented instance of Chinese "ritualization." Because imperial and sacred architecture closely resembled the homes of people and prescriptions for ritualization had filtered down to the village level (Hayes, in Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski 1985), I think we are justified in assuming analogous ritualization in other similar spaces. (I am proposing a modeling of processes of modeling, not necessarily a congruence of local symbolic detail— it was control of this macroprocess that practitioners of *li* sought.)

In Chinese traditional architecture a center was constructed as the nexus
of inner (nei)/outer (wai) and upper (shang)/lower (xia). In early Chinese cities, walls and platforms were used, their boundary function later highlighted by gates and stairs. The altars of Grand Sacrifice comprised such concentric zones of boundary walls and levels of platforms. Ritual manuals draw attention to action at the points of transition: gates between inner and outer, and stairs between upper and lower. Ritualists’ bodies moved together through this inscribed space, centering it in ceremonial action.

Each participant’s own body was not a closed container-thing but rather, like the alter spaces, a complex concatenation of ever more intimate boundaries. The body was an ensemble of focused fields whose shifting edges and surfaces provided the sites for articulation between inner and outer. If the self could contain and develop an interiority, it was because it could differentiate and bound. What is interpreted in Chinese philosophical texts as the privileging of interiority, an inner self, can be better understood as valuable proof of boundary creation and control for which the body was necessary. Thus the “centering” action of the self through the body paradoxically takes place at its edges, on its surfaces, and through its senses, which act as gates to the outside world. Concentrating upon the body as boundary-maker focuses us firmly in the realm of culturally constructive practices like dress and gesture. We overcome the metaphysical discourses of secret, hidden interiority as the “inside” is exposed as created in relation to the “outside” by the boundary itself.18 The pertinent questions become: how are these boundaries created, and by whom?

Imperial Grand Sacrifice presents us a model of ritualized bodiliness and subjectivity coming into being through what Roger Ames calls “process ontology” (Hall and Ames 1987). People do not consist of divinely endowed or biologically fixed human nature. Instead they are exemplars of dynamically contingent positions both in space and in social hierarchy. In the terms developed here, they are boundary makers and breakers. There is no boundary unless there is the possibility of its transgression; for “centering” to occur, boundaries must be reestablished and reproduced. This notion has profound implications for the construction of gender, for in such a shifting cosmos, how could it be fixed? Here Tani Barlow’s (1991, 135, 136) discussion of yin/yang and gender is very illuminating:
The forces yin/yang are many things: logical relationships (up/down, in/out, husband/wife), practical forces, “designations for polar aspects of effect,” and in a social sense, powers inscribing hierarchy. . . . What appears as “gender” are yin/yang differentiated positions: not two anatomical “sexes,” but a profusion of relational, bound and unequal dyads, each signifying difference and positioning difference analogically.  

I would like to highlight three aspects of yin/yang which I consider to be especially important for boundary creation within li: their polarity, their relative positionality, and their tendency to unequal encompassment.

Their “popularity” differs from such post-Cartesian “dualities” as mind/body and spirit/matter (to name two of the great ones). Yang and yin mutually transform into one another: as night into day, as extreme heat into a cooling phase, as the waxing moon into a moon that wanes, as what goes up into what comes down. When understood as inter-implicated in this manner in philosophical writing and later interpretation, each term seems equally powerful. Thus the version of polar reciprocity that has retained a remarkably tenacious hold on the imagination is one of equality. Of course, in the ritual and social workings of the relationships explained/created within yin/yang logics, this is never truly so, for, of course, one set of realities named by yin/yang classification does not seem to transform into another, such as male and female—or do they? (Furth 1988).

That brings us to their positional and relative relationship: something can be yin only in relation to something that is yang—and everything in the cosmos is thought to be so positioned, including people in the Five Bonds. The sons obey the father because he has given them the example of his own filial obedience. They are yin to him as he is yin to his own father. (The filial food chain tops out with heaven.) No one is ever completely in charge here. It is possible to imagine women occupying yang positions: every mother has done so by virtue of her parenting. And everyone moves up the chain with age. There are very special examples of women occupying positions endowed with the yang power of initiation rather than the yin power of completion.  

Empress Wu Zetian of the Tang, who was ritually an emperor, was the culturally frightening precedent for Empress Zi
Xi and Jiang Qing. There were also the endless tales of cross-dressing women taking the examinations or performing deeds of filial valor (Barlow 1991). Thus, as Barlow has concluded, gender essence cannot be fixed as yin, for biological women could occupy the yang position. Conversely, biological essence was not a final, determining explanation for domination.

Finally, as I have shown for Grand Sacrificial form elsewhere (Zito 1984), and as Steve Sangren (1987) has shown for Ma Tsu and Kuan-yin, yang always somehow "encompasses" yin. They are not equipoised equals: Sangren notes that yang is constantly associated with "order," yin with "disorder" (p. 65). By virtue of the boundary between the two being itself a culturally ordered construction, order contains disorder. So, studies that exalt the "feminine" yin principle remain abstract and in fact can mask real gender inequality.

Yin/yang logics of mutually transforming polarity, relative position, and encompassing inequality create the fluid boundaries so necessary to centering within the discourse of li. The primary constructive metaphor for bodies in imperial ritual practice was the vessel as boundary maker. The positions of embodied power it constructed were ruler/subject and father/son, positions usually (as Barlow [1991] reminds us)— but not always— occupied by biological males. The vessel metaphor of Grand Sacrifice organizes only two of the Five Bonds— but the most powerful two. What people occupying these positions centered into a controllable whole were texts and performances. Thus, I have called their embodied position the yang body of power: the power of encompassment.

Those interpellated into the positions of wife, daughter, and younger— usually, but not always, the biological female— were obviously disadvantaged under inscriptions which privileged the yang body of boundary-making and encompassment. People who did not "center" faced exclusion from the twin authority of both writing and ritualization.

There are important implications for gendering in specifying closely how the yang body of power was produced. One vexing problem in studying gender in imperial China has been the marked absence just outlined of a foundational discourse of biological essence upon which gender inequity has been based. An enormous amount of feminist critical historiography has deconstructed the roots of our own oppression in biologism, which in
this case can be treated as a Big Ideological Mystification. Deprived of this “resource” for theorizing, where does the feminist historian of China turn?

Foucault’s work on the microprocesses of “discipline” seems one promising avenue. For Foucault “discipline” does not act upon an already previously present embodied subjectivity (the way Biology intrudes upon innocent women’s bodies and appropriates them from outside) but rather brings it into being through practices as varied as schooling, medicine, and judicial punishment. Foucault’s body exists in a field of power relations that “have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs” (Foucault 1979, 25). Foucault does not reify power as something that conquers from without, seeing it rather as that which produces from within, generating and conjoining the simultaneous effects of both individual body/subjects and the social body (Foucault 1980). A salient feature of Foucault’s project has been to include theorizing as one practice among the many that constitute such powerfully constitutive discursive forms.

There are at least three reasons why such an analytic project seems especially helpful in understanding li. First, Foucault is relentless in his rejection of post-Cartesian objectivism that would separate minds from bodies, ideas from institutions. For him, power is not simply wielded from above, but rather circulates through the social body’s various sites of productivity (institutions, subject positions, linguistic practices). Foucault stands as a nondialectician because he does not entertain the foundational epistemological splits upon which dialectical reasoning is founded — especially subject/object.

The problem for Chinese living within li differed from our own metaphysical difficulty of closing gaps: between nature and culture, self and other, subject and object, person and God, meaning and performance. On the contrary, they set about making distinctions in a cosmos that threatened to bind itself too closely together, to collapse into an ungovernable homogeneity. Boundaries had to be made, but within the rules of this cosmic frame, they then had to be deployed toward an understanding of unity that contains differences (= hierarchy). Foucault’s vision of an ever-shifting terrain of micropowers promises a better language in which to speak of the Chinese universe of dynamic contingency. At the same time, his language
of “power” allows us to consider still the problems of hegemony and dominance and avoid lapsing into the imputation of Chinese utopian difference from our own oppressive reifications.

The second reason I think Foucault’s approach to power in social life is useful in understanding li lies in his devotion to the social “body”—the personal body is produced through social practices, and, conversely through those practices, social life ramifies. In a world governed by the common sense of possessive individualism, the difficulties of capturing and conveying a sense of how thoroughly everyday life in imperial China was saturated by micropractices of sociality cannot be overstated. When Chinese sociality is imagined by analysts, there has been a tendency to exoticize it negatively, seeing the Chinese as those “groupie” Others, heirs to a long-standing tradition of totalitarianism. How should we convey a sense of hierarchy, a form of social organization we imagine is long dead among ourselves, that preserves possibilities of resistance within itself?

This specifically Chinese sort of hierarchy operated according to a logic of the encompassment of asymmetries that we have just outlined in yin/yang thinking. In such a social formation, power lay in “centering,” creating boundaries that displayed difference as mutually and connected portions of a greater whole. Dorothy Ko (1992, 16) has noted that from the seventeenth century “Confucian reformers sought to cure the world by restoring hierarchies and boundaries.” The “centering” position of the yang body of power (most perfectly exemplified by the emperor) was ideologically charged as the most desirable subject position, the “initiator.” Here we might examine the ritualizations of spatial seclusion practiced upon the bodies of women as distinctions performed into being upon the flesh of those most often occupying the yin position of completer. But we must do so remembering Foucault’s important point that power can never be reduced to mere coercion, and in fact that freedom of some sort is one of the preconditions and supports of power (Foucault 1983).

Feet broken and wrapped in ten feet of white silk reiterated more intimately in skin and bone a boundary already visible as walls. Women performed these rituals of bodily boundary discipline upon their daughters so that they might successfully marry and bear sons. Women sacrificed themselves for their sons who would themselves become centerers in per-
forming ancestral sacrificial ritualizations. A feminine gesture of bounding performed by a yang mother upon a yin daughter is in turn eventually encompassed by the daughter’s son’s text/performance. Yet his act of encompassment is more complete. How is this concretely so in terms of Grand Sacrifice?

Is another sort of boundary being maintained between production and circulation? The throne sought control in Grand Sacrifice over both the production of persons and the circulation of meaning in the discourses of wen and xiao as text/performance. In its performance aspect, the imperium enacted the production of xiao (filiality) in the imperial round of ritual, especially sacrifice. But it also sought to extend its ability to model xiao through the formal textual specification of ritualizations of homologous ancestral veneration that deployed the bodies of loyal subjects throughout the realm in the intimacy of domestic space. Furthermore, in its sanction of the circulation of authoritative handbooks, it encouraged emulation of the throne in the act of script production as well.

We might then be tempted to take a pessimistic view of women as doubly negated. Rarely literate, they could only approximate the fulfillment of filial duty due their own ancestors, whom they left behind to join another family. Yet they were necessary to this particular discursive production in dauntingly material ways. They wove the silk upon which men wrote and bore the sons who venerated their husbands. These disciplined relinquishments of mobility, of participation in circulation, insured and justified the control of their produced value. But it is important to note that “discipline” has a very Foucauldian ring. In this case it also denotes a kind of participation, a learning of a skill and the knowledge of a position—the skill of being feminine, of embodying a certain and necessarily absolutely different place within the whole. Indeed, recent discussion of women’s poetry in the late Qing shows that despite efforts to allocate writing to yang maleness, women continued their literary production (Robertson 1992, 64; Mann 1992, 56).

The circumstances under which they did so were, however, very telling in terms of the logic of li and ritualization that I am proposing. Their participation in adult sociality and thus li first of all meant endless performance in the intricate round of the disciplined female life of footbinding,
marriage, childbearing, and domestic labor. By confining yin-positioned women physically into demarcated, gendered, walled spaces, men created an encompassing totality of yang = male = whole, and reserved praxis for themselves, ideally assuming that women would only enact the scripts that men prepared. And it was true that women rarely participated in the expressive practices of writing, building, and ceremonial that constituted wen, cosmic text-pattern. Thus they rarely achieved the centering of a praxis that combined text and performance in the terms laid out in Grand Sacrifice.

When women did write poetry, according to Maureen Robertson (1992, 68), they often did so in voices that internalized the masculine position. In other words, taking up the yang position often entailed speaking in a masculine voice. Conversely, when men wrote from the yin position, they “ventriloquized” a woman’s voice, producing a voyeuristic subject of “passive, narcissistic women, [and] romanticized suffering” (p. 69). Thus, in writing poetry, gendered reversibility of voice was quite common. Yet the encompassment of yin-positioned women deprived of the opportunity to “center” continued.

Robertson points out that pre-seventeenth-century women who have literary remains were “all courtesans, entertainers, Daoist women, people living outside the family context” where their writings could circulate. “The social circulation of these women was analogous to the free circulation of their writings; both were transgressive and were equated with promiscuity” (p. 73). Later, women developed a literary culture “almost entirely within the domestic setting” (p. 101). Women could write provided they remained bound to home and family, reinscribing the boundary between the production of persons, xiao, and circulation of meaning, wen. Foucault’s nuanced treatment of the complex interplay of bodily performances and the classificatory practices that seek to shape them should prove very useful in sorting out these very complicated issues of gender and power.

Foucault’s self-reflexive inclusion of theorization itself as constitutive of power/knowledge is the third and final reason for paying close attention to his work. The “ritualizations” that occasioned and molded subjectivities in terms of action within space were only part of li. Li as discourse sought to encompass and control all such potent activity, from how to dress, build a
house, eat, and entertain guests to how to venerate ancestors. It did so by claiming the right to award classificatory power to certain positions and practices. Literati consecrated their abilities according to the discursive rules of *li* itself by “ritualizing” their own writing and record keeping—calligraphy, editing and studying, and the myriad ways the imperium employed texts as ritual artifacts. By subjecting themselves to the same microritualizing disciplines arranged in spatiotemporal logics homologous to other ceremonial, their own agency disappears in their labor to make the emperor visible.

Thus, *li* was not “ritual” in the way we think of ritual—rather it contained “ritualization” à la Bourdieu’s habitus as one of its most volatile and valuable areas of discursive construction and domination.

Granting *li* its full sophistication means thinking of *li* as a discourse that sought not only to model perfect praxis, but also to designate which subject positions would be excluded from the possibility of full participation. We watch our “object,” Chinese social experience as recorded in artifacts and texts, dissolve into complex, reflexively constructed processes. As cultural historians, we may have to approach categories like “gender” in a wholly new fashion. The reflexively constructed processes of social life that form the object of cultural history must be accounted for upon two levels: as description of that life (the positivist level), and as the thoughtful and material processes that generated such description (the discursive level).26 Folded within the “facts” of social life are the myriad local theorizations that guided their production. Overlooking this component of our “object” truly robs its creators of their subjectivity and allows the construction of an exclusive history wherein we produce theory and our informants produce data (we think, they act; we observe in the audience taking notes while they ritualize). Such “objectivizing” methods subject *li* and its practitioners to an encompassment analogous to the way the yang body of power sought to relegate those in yin positions to endless performance, necessary to the project but never quite as perfect as our thinking selves.
Notes

This essay was first prepared as part of a panel organized by James Hevia for the 1992 Association of Asian Studies meeting. I would like to thank the two anonymous readers who made such helpful suggestions and John Calagione, who gave the essay many readings. Any persisting errors of interpretation rest solely with me.

1 Space does not permit me to recapitulate debates over the relationship between *li* and “popular religion.” Elsewhere I have discussed how homologies in ceremonial form link imperial sacrificial *li* and the veneration of the City God (Zito 1987). For overviews and new approaches to the problem of elite/popular, see Bell 1989 and DeBernardi 1992. See also Sangren 1984.

2 I borrow this term from Catherine Bell’s important recent study *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (1992).

3 For symbolic anthropologists like Clifford Geertz and especially David Schneider (students of Parsons), “culture” was conveyed by material and publicly accessible symbols (Geertz 1983). While this admirable emphasis upon the external finally saved American anthropology from earlier attempts to “get inside” informants’ heads, it also harbored idealist tendencies best summed up by Geertz’s much-discussed formulation that “culture is like a text” (pp. 30–33). And, we are left to assume, actors are like readers. What Geertzians have notoriously neglected is the “writing” aspect of culture as text: how the system is produced within social life. Structuralism’s sins of reification are more widely known: denial of an intentional subject, neglect of history (Ortner 1984, 137–138).

4 Victor Turner (1969) stresses that symbols produce social transformations, and do not merely offer a representation to be “read.” As Edward L. Schiefflen (1985, 709) puts it: “Performance does not construct a symbolic reality in the manner of presenting an argument, description, or commentary. Rather, it does so by socially constructing a situation in which the participants experience symbolic meanings as part of the process of what they are already doing.”

For Stanley Tambiah (1985, 155), a performative theory of ritual serves most importantly to draw attention to a ritual’s power to constitute a social reality, rather than merely mystify another, prior “real world” of “brute facts.”


6 See Fisher 1977; Ho Yun-yi 1976; and Wechsler 1985 on imperial ritual in the Tang period. Pamela Crossley (1992, 1471) seems to be calling for a belated return to this older functionalist reading of ritual when she discusses the “emperorship” as “an ensemble of instruments playing a dynamic role” that “itself can be interpreted as an organism.”
7 Paul Rabinow (1986) states that "unlike Aristotle, Descartes' conception of knowing rests on having correct representations in an internal space, the mind."

8 On separating the body from the mind, see essays in Sheets-Johnstone 1992, especially "The Bodily Nature of the Self, or What Descartes Should Have Conceded Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia," by Albert Johnstone (pp. 16–47), and "The Human Body as Historical Body and Cultural Symptom," by Robert Romanshyn (pp. 159–179). On separating the actor from the world, see Bourdieu 1977 and Bell 1992.

9 She implies that we then project these concerns upon the ritualists we study. In some cases that is undoubtedly true, yet is it not also possible that some ritualists indeed might be working through meditations upon the operations of social life similar to our own in form and sophistication if not in the particulars of content?

10 Tani Barlow (1991) uses "protocol" to translate li itself.


12 In Wu Jingzi's mid-eighteenth-century novel Rulin waishi (The scholars), a veritable catalog of bogus ceremonies, correct knowledge, and frivolous displays clash to produce a lively picture of life within the discourses of li.

13 For example, chap. 32 of the Da Qing tongli (Comprehensive rites of the Qing) ([1756] 1824) details ceremonies for welcoming completed court documentation like the Veritable Records and the Sacred Edicts.

14 The growing interest from the late Song period in reinventing the agnatic lineage as a means for local gentry to "enhance their position of dominance and permit them a range of strategies to mobilize their socially subordinate kin" led to a revival in neo-Confucian versions of funerary li (Brooks 1989, 473).

15 In their discussion of the "long 18th c.," Susan Naquin and Evelyn Rawski (1987, 16, 39, 45) point to the steady rise in wealth that resulted in upward mobility through education for more people. Notice how many of the "symbols of elite lifestyle" were associated with li: printed genealogies, imposing ancestor halls, elaborate graves, education, special clothing, and carriages, as well as servants, multiple sexual partners at home, and long fingernails (p. 125).

16 The quote is from Liji, "Li Transforms," Liji zhengyi vol. 2, 1422. Porkert (1974, 36–37) uses the image of the pivot to enrich our understanding of "centering" in terms of yin and yang: "The pivot is prerequisite to any turning movement yet does not participate in this movement. The pivot may therefore be conceived as a motionless center or as an organ that controls movement." Here, yin and yang are tripartite, not simply bipartite, imagined sharing a third term.

17 Although, in her discussion of "protocols" of "body etiquette" for gendering, Barlow (1991) correctly draws attention to how detailed they could be, my point here is that the impulse to produce such invasive minutiae on the conduct of the self in everyday life ("speaking without moving the lips, standing without wiggling your skirt") operates at the level of inscription within the discourse of li. Thus the question becomes: who provides the sur-
faces for inscription and who writes? Then again, Barlow's definition of "protocol" is itself useful in capturing how activities of inscription bleed into ritualization itself: "It is neither a mere code, nor a map, nor a 'role.' It rests on a shifting foundation, the cosmic activity of yin/yang, yet provides advice and counsel on achieving naturalized, normative, gendered relational subjects. Protocols instruct. They provide continuity and reinforced subject positions by linking the archaic past in which these protocols were first established to contemporary texts" (p. 137; my italics). For further detailed discussion of the relation of text/performance within li, see Zito 1989.

18 One locus classicus for work on boundary-making is Mary Douglas (1966) 1989. Judith Butler (1990) has recently applied Douglas to gender, emphasizing in a manner analogous to my own the liberatory possibilities of moving from the metaphysics of gender essence to the cultural construction of gender as performance.

19 Gender operating as a subset of the correlative logic of yin/yang is laid out nicely by the Song philosopher Cheng Yi: "Yang occupies five and resides on the outside; yin occupies two and stays on the inside; thus male and female attain their correct place. The way of honored and lowly, inner and outer correctly corresponds to the great meaning of Heaven and Earth, yin and yang" (cited by Dorothy Ko [1992, 15] in the context of discussing gender in the eighteenth century).

20 See Hevia 1989 for the use of "initiation" and "completion" in the context of guest ritual.

21 Charlotte Furth (1988) has produced the first body of work exploring traditional medical texts' work on women. As I read them, the essays provoke great doubt that the neat Enlightenment split between culture and nature within whose crevice natural sciences like biology have flourished was, in the Chinese case, a very messy and constantly transforming boundary. Judith Farquhar's (forthcoming) ethnographic and historical work on Chinese medicine draws more explicit attention to "transforming resonance" as an underlying cosmology that destabilizes any fixed biological essence for bodies.

22 My discussion of Foucault draws upon Bell 1992 and essays in Diamond and Quinby 1988, especially Sandra Lee Bartky's "Foucault, Femininity and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power."

23 The issue of separate women's spheres in China provides one theme taken up by writers, in an excellent special issue of Late Imperial China on poetry and women's culture. For instance, Marie Bruneau (1992) contrasts the late imperial Chinese circumstances with those in Europe, pointing out the irony of a strict separation that seems to have protected women's writing from the extremes of anxiety felt by European men, who faced women more often on their own "public" terrain (p. 162).

24 Dorothy Ko (1992 and passim) is especially eager to make the case that gender distinction in China differs so profoundly from that in Europe that seclusion provided positive opportunities for women to develop a true "separate sphere." We will later discuss "discipline" and "mastery" as important aspects (and satisfying) of the operation of micropowers.
25 Ko (1992, 11) has discovered women’s erotic poetry extolling bound feet.
26 Thus we avoid the objectivist positivist error of assuming we can see through transparent texts and artifacts to “reality.” This innovative approach has been most thoroughly theorized by the “new historicists,” whose flagship journal Representations is Berkeley-based (Veeser 1989; Krieger 1987).

References


Bruneau, Marie Florine. 1992. “Learned and Literary Women in Late Imperial China and Early Modern Europe.” *Late Imperial China* 13, no. 1 (June): 156–172.


